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Description
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the  forefront 
of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half 
a billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political challenges? 
Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only because current 
reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the 
preferences for reform amongst national elites and  publics. Although EU support 
has interested scholars for over three decades now, we  virtually know nothing 
about public support for EU reform. Current  research  focuses  almost exclusively 
on the causes of support for the current project and fails to provide a sufficient 
basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the  feasibility and sustainability of 
EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst  national publics. eupinions 
examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and 
employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy 
makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
Executive Summary
When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time’s waste. 
William Shakespeare, Sonnet 30
N ostalgia is a powerful political tool. References to a better past are skillfully employed by populist political entrepreneurs to fuel dissat-isfaction with present-day politics and anxiety about the future. But we know little about who is most receptive to those messages evoking 
a halcyon, bygone era. What share of the European public is nostalgic about the 
past, and what kind of political solutions does it prefer? In this report, we pro-
vide an in-depth look into Europeans’ feelings of nostalgia and how they affect 
views about politics today. Our empirical evidence is based on a representative 
survey conducted in July 2018 in which 10,885 EU citizens participated.
Our findings show that a majority of the European public can be classified as 
nostalgic. Although younger segments of the population are slightly less nostalgic 
than their older counterparts, a majority of those over 35 years of age think that 
the world used to be a better place. The younger generations are least nostalgic in 
Poland, most so in Italy. Our evidence suggests that those most likely to harbour 
feelings of nostalgia are men, the unemployed, those who feel most economically 
anxious, and those who feel that they belong to the working class.
Psychological research shows that feelings of nostalgia are often triggered by 
negative moods, anxiety, or insecurity. Nostalgia allows for a retreat into a state 
of order in which life is more predicable and thus serves as a internal stabiliz-
ing-mechanism. What is described by psychologists as a psychological resource 
serves in the political realm as an instrument for agitation. Which politics attract 
those individuals who feel nostalgia, and what political priorities do such persons 
have? On average, those who are nostalgic place themselves somewhat more on 
the right of the political spectrum, while those who do not feel nostalgic consider 
themselves more to the left. In terms of political priorities, we find that feelings 
of nostalgia coincide with an increased concern about migration and terrorism. 
Overall, the policy preferences of those who feel nostalgic differ most strongly 
from those who do not feel nostalgic when it comes to migration and immigration. 
Nostalgic types seem to be more fearful of immigrants and the consequences of 
migration.
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Here are some of the key findings in our report:
• A majority of the European public can be classified as nostalgic. 67 percent 
think that the world used to be a better place.
• Feelings of nostalgia are most pronounced among Italian respondents and 
least among Polish respondents. 77 percent of Italians think that the world 
used to be a better place, while 59 percent of Poles think the same.
• More or less equal shares of French, German, and Spanish respondents 
harbour feelings of nostalgia. 65 percent of the French, 61 percent of 
Germans, and 64 percent of Spaniards think that the world used to be better.
• Nostalgia is least pronounced among younger respondents, those below 
25 years of age.
• Men are more likely to be nostalgic than women, 53 versus 47 percent 
respectively.
• The majority of those (53 percent) who feel nostalgic place themselves on 
the right of the political spectrum, while those who do not feel nostalgia 
(58 percent) place themselves more on the left.
• 78 percent of those who feel nostalgic think that recent immigrants do not 
want to fit into society, while 63 percent of those who do not feel nostalgic 
think the same.
• 53 percent of those who feel nostalgic think that immigrants take away the 
jobs of natives, while only 30 percent of those who do not feel nostalgic 
think the same.
• Those who feel nostalgic do not differ much from their non-nostalgic 
counterparts when it comes to their views on Europe – with one exception. 
While a large majority of those who are not nostalgic want to remain in the 
EU (82 percent), a lesser share of those who feel nostalgic do (67 percent).
• Fighting terrorism is the biggest priority for those who feel nostalgic 
(60 percent), followed by managing migration (51 percent). Only 47 percent 
of those who are not nostalgic think that terrorism should be the top 
political priority in the future, followed by 43 percent who say that migration 
should be.
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Introduction
I n our previous reports, “Fear Not Values: Public Opinion and the Populist Vote in Europe” and “Globalization and the EU: Threat or Opportunity?”, we demonstrated that many Europeans are worried about the future. As a result of globalization and other sweeping pro-
cesses of societal change, significant parts of the European public today express 
a considerable degree of social, economic, and political insecurity. Moreover, 
our previous reports suggest that these anxieties coincide with high levels of 
distrust toward mainstream political elites and political institutions, and strong 
support for populist movements and parties on the far right and far left.
In this report, we explore how these heightened levels of anxiety and fear 
about the future relate to Europeans’ views about the past. Specifically, we ex-
amine feelings of nostalgia. As do prominent sociologists and psychologists, 
we define nostalgia as the degree to which people feel that the past was better 
than the present, a sense of loss for times bygone (e.g. Davis 1979, Batcho 1995, 
Sedikidis et al. 2008, Duyvendank 2011). The scholarship suggests that feelings 
of nostalgia are commonly triggered in response to increased anxiety and fear 
fuelled by processes of rapid personal or societal change (Davis 1979, Sedikidis 
et al. 2008).
Nostalgia is a political tool (Duyvendank 2011). Nostalgic rhetoric has been 
skilfully employed by populist political entrepreneurs on the left and right to 
fuel dissatisfaction with the political system and distrust of mainstream polit-
ical elites at the national and European level (Gaston and Hilhorst 2018). These 
political entrepreneurs paint pictures of a supposedly better past in which life 
was more pleasant, untarnished, and predictable; with these images they stir 
up dissatisfaction with the present and anxiety about future. The far right, in 
particular, in many European countries has been able to successfully craft an 
anti-establishment discourse through a rhetoric highlighting “the decline of a 
golden age” and proposing divisive solutions, mostly based on in-group favour-
itism and ethnocentrism, to combat these “alleged processes of decay” (Elgenius 
and Rydgren 2018: 1). Nostalgia has become a powerful political tool to glorify 
the past, to enable politicians to cull support for regaining that perceived to have 
been lost, and to reaffirm values and identities that are being challenged by the 
rapid pace of societal change.
While we know that political entrepreneurs, especially those on the far right 
and far left, have skilfully fuelled and exploited feelings of nostalgia in order to 
gain prominence in the public debate and expand their electoral base, we know 
much less about who is receptive to these messages. Also, we do not know where 
those who feel nostalgic place themselves on the political spectrum, and what 
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kind of policy priorities and positions they prefer. In this report, we provide an 
in-depth look into people’s feelings of nostalgia and how they affect political 
views by addressing three main questions:
1. Who is nostalgic?
2. Where do people who feel nostalgic place themselves on a left-right political 
spectrum?
3. What policies do people who feel nostalgic support?
This report answers these questions by presenting evidence based on a survey 
conducted in July 2018 in which we interviewed over 10,000 EU citizens. We pres-
ent two sets of evidence. One set is based on a sample capturing public opinion 
in the EU28, and the other completes the picture by focusing more in-depth on 
respondents from the five largest member states in terms of population: France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain.
The report is organized into five parts. First, we provide a short introduction 
to the concept of nostalgia and introduce our measurement of it. Second, we ex-
amine the degree to which the European public displays feelings of nostalgia and 
which socio-demographic profile characterizes them. Third, we explore the ideo-
logical left-right profile of those interviewed about nostalgia. Fourth, we contrast 
the policy positions and priorities of those who feel nostalgic with those who do 
not. Finally, we conclude by highlighting the most fruitful political responses to 
increasing feelings of nostalgia and the nostalgic political frames employed by 
populist and far-right and far-left political entrepreneurs. 
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In Focus
Feelings of Nostalgia:  
A Short Overview
T he word nostalgia stems from two Greek roots: nostos meaning “return home” and algia “longing.” While nostalgia features prominently in the arts and literature, social scientists have paid far less attention to the concept. The term was initially coined by a Swiss physician, 
Johannes Hofer (1669/1752), who used it in reference to adverse psychological 
symptoms displayed by Swiss mercenaries who spend considerable time abroad. 
More contemporary thinking, mostly stemming from psychology and sociology, 
perceives nostalgia as either a personal sentiment or worldview relating to the 
past (Davis 1979, Batcho 1995, Sedikidis et al. 2008). While psychologists view 
feelings of nostalgia primarily in reference to personal experiences, such as a 
birth, education level, or other personal milestones, (Batcho 1995, Sedikidis et 
al. 2008), sociologists define it in a much broader sense and relate it to more 
general views about the state of the world (Davis 1979, Duyvendak 2011). For 
the purpose of this report, we follow the latter tradition and define nostalgia as 
a feeling that the world used to be a better place, a sense that something good 
about the past has been lost.
Nostalgia develops in comparison to a benchmark, a reference point in the 
past (for a discussion of the importance of benchmarks for European public opin-
ion, see De Vries 2018). Because of the fact that these benchmarks are based on a 
recollection of past times, they will most likely be the result of processes of selec-
tive memory and represent more of an idealized past rather than actual depiction. 
Nostalgia may represent feelings of longing for a past that never existed, a past 
that is largely constructed. As such, nostalgia may tell us more about present 
moods than past realities (Nisbet 1972).
Feelings of nostalgia are often triggered by negative moods, anxiety or insecu-
rity about the present accompanying periods of considerable societal change and 
upheaval. In previous reports, we have shown that globalization has triggered such 
fears (De Vries and Hoffmann 2016). Globalization, as a process of large-scale social 
change, is perceived by many to create tensions with current and past customs and 
traditions. As a result, it can be perceived as threatening the status quo and current 
way of life. This may in turn trigger feelings of chaos, anxiety, and insecurity.
Nostalgia can act as a powerful means to distract from such anxieties and 
perceived threats (Sedikidis et al. 2008). It allows for a retreat into a state of order 
in which life is more predictable. Feelings of nostalgia often have a conservative 
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bent. They may attract people to distinctively conservative political worldviews 
that stress the preservation of traditional values and previous practices and cus-
toms (Davis 1979, Smeekes et al. 2015). These conservative worldviews, with an 
emphasis on safeguarding tradition, can offer distressed individuals a coping 
mechanism to better deal with their anxiety and fears. Nostalgia can thus provide 
a powerful substitute source of control that helps anxious and fearful individuals 
to permeate their worlds with order and predictability, and create an elevated 
sense of self-worth or personal control (Kay et al. 2008, Sedikidis et al. 2008, 
Fritsche et al. 2017).
In political discourse, the term nostalgia is often employed in reference to 
a golden age, as a return, at least in spirit, to a previous more preferable period 
in a nation’s history (Smith 2009, Mazur 2015). The development of nostalgic 
political rhetoric can subsequently contribute to a narrative of decline and crisis, 
of continuity against change (Elgenius 2011, 2015). Nostalgic political rhetoric is 
employed by both left-wing and right-wing political forces, usually on the fring-
es of the political spectrum, and at the expensive centrist political forces (for an 
overview see Gaston and Hilhorst 2018). While providing a clearly different nar-
rative about the past, political entrepreneurs on the far left and far right develop 
a rhetoric of decline that questions the motives of current political elites. It may 
even sow doubts about the representative system as a whole with the defence of a 
desire for ‘genuine political involvement’ and by ‘the people’.
On the left, one can currently think of the British Labour Party under the 
leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, the German Left Party under Sarah Wagenknecht, 
and Senator Bernie Sanders in the United States for example. Far-right parties 
have perhaps been most successful at fuelling and exploiting feelings of nostal-
gia (Betz and Johnson 2004, Rydgren 2018, Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018). 
This might be because these parties are able to effectively frame their anti-elit-
ist discourse of current malaise in terms of the decline of a national golden age 
(Elgenius and Rydgren 2018, Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018). Referring to a 
sense of better past or even national grandeur acts as a suitable political device 
in the present. Think of Donald Trump’s campaign slogan of “Making Ameri-
ca Great Again”, or the slogan of many Brexiters: “Taking Our Country Back”. 
While few right-wing political entrepreneurs may actually wish to return to the 
periods they purport to idealize (Rydgren 2018), they can reap electoral gains by 
constructing a political project based on the past and claiming that the present 
one is doomed to fail.
After having elaborated some of the social and political roots of the con-
cept of nostalgia, the question now is how we can best empirically measure 
it. While no established tradition exists, most empirical approaches focus on 
people’s perceptions of the past (Batcho 1995). While these perceptions could 
empirically be linked to general feelings of societal discontent, insecurity, un-
ease, or anxiety (Steenvoorden 2015), it follows from our discussion above that 
we ought to capture their conceptual content separately. This is because many 
psychologists and sociologists view nostalgia as a coping mechanism, as a re-
action to heightened levels of insecurity or anxiety. Recent studies have opera-
tionalized nostalgia by asking respondents if they felt that life was better when 
they were growing up; whether their community had improved or declined over 
the course of their lifetime or whether things in their country where better in 
the past (Gaston and Hilhorst 2018, Fieldhouse et al. 2016). We base our empir-
ical measure of nostalgia on this previous work, and aim to evaluate people’s 
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general perceptions of the past. In order to determine people’s degree of nos-
talgia, we rely on the following survey question: To what extent do you agree 
with the following statement? “The world used to be a much better place.” The 
answer categories were “completely disagree”, “disagree”, “agree”, and “com-
pletely agree”. We classify respondents as nostalgic when they either respond 
to “agree” or “completely agree” with the statement, and those as non-nos-
talgic who either “completely disagree” or “disagree”. In the next section, we 
explore the share of the European public that can be classified as nostalgic, and 
contrast its socio-demographic profile to those who are not.
Who Is Nostalgic?
Figure 1 provides an overview of the share of people in the EU28 and the five larg-
est EU member states – Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain – who can be clas-
sified as nostalgic versus those that are not. Interestingly, the results show that a 
majority of the European public can be classified as nostalgic and agrees with the 
statement that “the world used to be a better place”. 67 percent of citizens within 
the EU as a whole think that the world used to be a better place. More or less equal 
shares of French, German, and Spanish respondents think the same: 65, 61, and 
64 percent think that the world used to be better.
In a recent study of popular and party-based nostalgia in Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom, political scientists Sophie Gaston and Sasha Hilhorst (2018) 
also find that feelings of nostalgia are widespread. In our survey, nostalgia is least 
pronounced among the Polish public: 59 percent of Polish respondents think the 
world used to a better place. It is most pronounced in Italy, where a staggering 
77 percent of Italian respondents think that the world used to be a better place.
Given that feelings of nostalgia are commonly associated with a longing for 
the past as a means to deal with anxiety and insecurity about the present or future, 
it might be the case that nostalgia is 
somewhat more pronounced among 
older generations. Figure 2 below pro-
vides an overview of the share of the 
European public that displays feelings 
of nostalgia among five different age 
groups: 1) 16 to 25; 2) 26–35; 3) 36–
45; 4) 46–55; 5) 56–65.[1] The results 
for the EU28 suggest that those below 
35 are indeed the least nostalgic. But 
we also find very few differences 
among those between 36 and 65 years 
of age. This is perhaps not entirely 
surprising since studies in psychology 
that investigate generational differ-
ences in nostalgia find only small dif-
ferences based on age (Batcho 1995). 
The results for the EU28 suggest that a 
majority of respondents can be classi-
fied as nostalgic irrespective their age.
FIGURE 1 Who are the nostalgics?
Agree Disagree
EU28
67% 33%
France
65% 35%
Germany
61% 39%
Italy
77% 23%
Poland
59% 41%
Spain
64% 36%
Do you agree with the following statement? 
“The world used to be a much better place.”
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When we look more closely at age 
patterns in the five countries, we find 
that the youngest age cohort is least 
nostalgic in Poland, followed by Ger-
many. Only 35 percent of Polish re-
spondents between 16 and 25 think 
that the world used to be a better 
place, while 42 percent of Germans 
in the same age group think the same. 
The 16 to 25-year-olds in France and 
Spain are almost evenly split between 
feeling nostalgic and not. Nostal-
gia is most pronounced among the 
youngest age cohort in Italy. A large 
majority of the 16 to 25-year-olds in 
Italy, namely 64 percent, think that 
the world used to be a better place. 
Among the older age cohorts in Ita-
ly, we find a comparatively high level of nostalgia: 80 percent of the 56 to 
65-year-olds in Italy think the world used to be better.
What is the socio-demographic profile of those who feel nostalgic versus 
those who do not? Table 1 provides this information. Specifically, the figure con-
trasts the share of economically anxious, men, belonging to the working class, 
low educated, unemployed or rural residents among those who feel nostalgic ver-
sus those who do not in our survey. 27 percent of those who feel nostalgic are 
also economically anxious versus only 16 percent among those who are not nos-
talgic. The share of men is much higher among those feeling nostalgic: 53 versus 
44 percent among those who do not feel nostalgic. The share of those who identify 
with the working class is also higher among those who feel nostalgic: 41 ver-
sus 30 percent. The share of those with only a high school education (or less) is 
also more pronounced among the group that feels nostalgic, 26 versus 20 per-
cent respectively. The differences based on rural residency or unemployment are 
overall much less pronounced. Taken together, this evidence suggests that men, 
the unemployed, and those who feel working class or economically anxious are 
especially overrepresented among those in our survey who feel nostalgic. These 
FIGURE 2 EU28: Who are the nostalgics 
across age groups?
Agree Disagree
Do you agree with the following statement? 
“The world used to be a much better place.”
16–25
52% 48%
26–35
65% 35%
36–45
72% 28%
46–55
71% 29%
56–65
70% 30%
Not-NostalgicNostalgic
ECONOMICALLY ANXIOUS27% 16%
MEN53% 44%
BELONGING TO THE WORKING CLASS41% 30%
LOW EDUCATED26% 20%
18% 14%UNEMPLOYED
25% 27%RURAL RESIDENTS 
TABLE 1 EU28: Nostalgic distributions across socio-economic groups?
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results support the idea that nostalgia may be an especially potent force among 
those who have already experienced or fear to experience soon economic hardship 
or lost social standing (Davis 1979, and more recently Gaston and Hilhorst 2018, 
Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018).
Where Do People Who Feel Nostalgic  
Place Themselves Politically?
Where do those who feel nostalgic place themselves on a left-right ideological 
spectrum? In our July 2018 survey, we also asked respondents about their ide-
ological views. Specifically, we asked them to place themselves on a spectrum 
encompassing left, centre left, centre right, and right. Figure 3 below provides 
an overview of the left-right placements of all respondents in the survey, while 
Figure 4 contrasts the left-right placements of those who feel nostalgic and those 
that do not. This allows us to get a sense of the extent to which people who feel 
nostalgic deviate in terms of their ideological self-placement.
Let us first turn to the results for the EU as a whole. In the EU28, we find that those 
who are nostalgic place themselves somewhat more on the right of the political spec-
trum, while those who do not feel nostalgic place themselves somewhat more to the 
left. Of those who think that the world used to be a better place, 20 percent view 
themselves as left, 27 percent as centre left, 32 percent as centre right, and 21 percent 
as right. Of those who do not think that the world used to be a better place, 22 per-
cent view themselves as left, 36 percent as centre left, 27 percent as centre right, and 
15 percent as right. When it comes to all respondents, 21 percent view themselves as 
left, 30 percent as centre left, 30 percent as centre right, and 19 percent as right.
The differences between those who feel nostalgic versus not based on their 
ideological left-right self-placements are most pronounced among French and 
German respondents. In France, among those who feel nostalgic 12 percent more 
Left Centre Left Centre Right Right
FIGURE 3 Personal political views on a left-right scale
EU28
France
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain
If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes your political views
on a left-right scale? 
31%
21%
13%
18%
19%
31%
19%
30%
44%
23%
24%
32%
21%
30%
36%
36%
24%
24%
29%
19%
7%
23%
33%
13%
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view themselves as right wing compared to those who do not feel nostalgic. An 
even starker pattern emerges from the German results: the share of those who 
view themselves as right or centre-right is 20 percent higher among those who 
feel nostalgic than those who do not. The differences in self-placement on an ide-
ological left-right scale are least pronounced among Polish respondents.
What Policies Do People Who Feel Nostalgic Support?
After having established who displays the strongest feelings of nostalgia and 
where those who feel nostalgic place themselves on a left-right ideological 
spectrum, we now turn to an examination of policy preferences and priorities. 
For this, we focus on political attitudes that relate to two sets of policy areas that 
have been among the most contentious and politically divisive in the European 
31% 15%
26%
France
32%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
12% 37%
53%
Germany
16%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
17% 21%
30%
Italy
21%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
21% 24%
24%
Poland
17%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
30% 31%
33%
Spain
33%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
20% 27%
36%
21%
22%
41%
28%
37%
31%
24%
25%
24%
25%
32%
27%
33%
20%
10%
3
25%
18%
31%
34%
15%
9%
21%
15%
EU28
22%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
Left Centre Left Centre Right Right
FIGURE 4 Personal political views on a left-right scale
If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes your political views
on a left-right scale? 
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context in recent years, namely immigration and European integration (Kriesi 
et al. 2008, De Vries 2018). We focus on people’s preferences concerning both of 
these policy areas, and begin by contrasting attitudes towards immigrates and 
immigration policy between those who feel nostalgic versus those who do not.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide an overview of immigration attitudes. Figure 
5 presents the share of those EU Europeans who agree with the following four 
statements :
1. Immigrants take jobs away from natives.
2. Recent immigrants don’t want to fit into society.
3. Immigration is good for the economy.
4. Immigrants enrich the cultural life of the nation.
The results suggest that those who think that the world used to be a better place 
are more likely to hold more negative views about immigration. Among those 
who feel nostalgic, 53 percent agree with the statement that “immigrants take 
away jobs from natives” and 78 percent agree with the statement that “recent 
immigrants don’t want to fit into society”. These shares are considerably low-
er among those who do not feel nostalgic, 30 versus 63 percent respectively. 
A large majority, over 60 percent of those who do not feel nostalgic agree with 
the statements that “immigration is good for the economy” and “immigrants 
enrich the cultural life of the nation”, while only 45 and 50 percent of those 
who do feel nostalgic agree.
78% 22%
37%
Recent immigrants do not want to fit into society
63%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
45% 55%
37%
Immigration is good for the economy
63%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
50% 50%
34%
Immigrants enrich cultural life
66%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
53% 47%
70%
Immigrants take away jobs from natives
30%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
FIGURE 5 EU28: Views on Immigration
Agree Disagree
Percentage of respondents agree or disagree with the following statements.
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Figure 6 aims to put these views about immigration in the context of views 
about other groups in society. The results are based on responses to a question 
asking which of the following six groups of people respondents do not wish to 
have as their neighbours:
1. immigrants;
2. lesbians or gays;
3. families with children;
4. people having a different religion;
5. people speaking a different language;
6. smokers.
The results reaffirm our previous impression that people who feel nostalgic 
are more wary of immigrants: 27 percent of them do not wish to have them as 
neighbours, while only 15 percent of those who do not feel nostalgic are of the 
same opinion. Among those who feel nostalgic, opposition towards immigrants 
as neighbours is the most pronounced compared to negative feelings towards 
13% 87%
91%
Lesbians or gays
9%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
9% 91%
93%
Families with children
7%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
10% 90%
94%
People having a different religion
6%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
10% 90%
93%
People speaking a different language
7%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
18% 82%
79%
Smokers
21%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
27% 73%
85%
Immigrants
15%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
FIGURE 6  EU28: Wanted as Neighbours?
No Yes
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any of the other groups. This is not the case among those who do not feel nos-
talgic. They are most strongly opposed to having smokers as their neighbours. 
The overall opposition towards immigrants as neighbours within our sample 
as a whole, is with less than 25 percent, not so high. It is important to keep in 
mind in this respect that respondents may want to give socially desirable an-
swers to this question in order not to appear prejudiced.
In a second step, we compare and contrast the EU attitudes and policy priorities 
of those who feel nostalgic versus those who do not. Figure 8 and Figure 9 provide 
this information. Figure 7 shows the share of respondents who wish their country 
to remain a member of the EU, wish to see more political and economic integration 
in Europe, want the EU to play a more active role on the world stage, want more 
EU involvement in border control, and think that EU citizens should be allowed 
to work and settle in other EU member states. Interestingly, the differences 
between those who feel nostalgic versus those who do not are much less pro-
nounced when it comes to people’s EU preferences compared to their attitudes 
towards immigration or immigrants. The exception to this pattern is the share of 
88% 12%
18%
Enhance EU border control
82%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
87% 13%
9%
Protect free movement
91%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
80% 20%
15%
EU should be more active in world affairs
85%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
51% 49%
43%
Need for more political and economic integration
57%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
55% 45%
43%
Allow EU migrants to work and settle
57%
Not Nostalgic
Nostalgic
67% 33%
18%82%
Not Nostalgic
Remain in EU
Nostalgic
FIGURE 7 EU expectations
Agree Disagree
Percentage of respondents agree or disagree with the following statements.
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those wishing to remain in the EU. The remain share is considerably lower among 
those who feel nostalgic compared to those who do not feel nostalgic, 67 versus 
82 percent respectively.
Finally, Figure 8 provides an overview of what people think the policy priorities of 
the EU should be in the future. The top policy priority of those who feel nostalgic is 
the fight against terrorism. 60 percent of those who feel nostalgic think that fight-
ing terrorism should be the most important policy goal that the EU should pursue 
in the coming years. The second most important policy priority is the management 
of migration. Interestingly, as in our previous report on globalization fears, feel-
ings of nostalgia coincide with an increased concern about migration and terror-
ism. For those who do not feel nostalgic, securing peace and protecting citizens’ 
rights are almost equally important compared to fighting terrorism.
Taken together, the findings in Figures 6 and 7, as well as 8 and 9, suggest that 
the policy preferences of those who feel nostalgic differ most strongly from those 
who do not feel nostalgic when it comes to migration and immigration. 
47%
60%
43%
51%
45%
43%
46%
42%
35%
28%
30%
27%
28%
22%
13%
16%
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FIGURE 8 EU28: EU’s Policy priorities
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Concluding Remarks
T In this report we show that large segments of the European public are nostalgic about the past. 67 percent of our respondents say that they think that the world used to be better place compared to today. Although feelings of nostalgia are lower among younger generations 
(those below 35 years of age), they do not differ much between those 36 and older. 
Feelings of nostalgia are most pronounced in Italy and least in Poland. Moreover, 
those who are nostalgic are more likely to view themselves as politically right 
wing. Interestingly, our results suggest that those who are nostalgic are not 
necessarily eurosceptics. What makes those who are nostalgic stand out is their 
sceptical view of immigration and migration, and their concern about terrorism.
Research from the fields of psychology and sociology suggests that nostalgia 
can be a coping mechanism to deal with feelings of anxiety or insecurity. Current-
ly, we are going through a period of considerable societal change and upheaval, 
stemming from x changes technological, political, and economic. Globalization, 
as a process of large-scale social change, is perceived by many as a threat to soci-
etal order and people’s standing, in that order. Nostalgic rhetoric about a societal 
golden age where everything was better and more predictable can serve as a pow-
erful antidote to heightened levels of anxiety and perceived threats. Such nostal-
gia favours order over chaos, the known over the unknown, the idealized over the 
real. It is perhaps no surprise that those who are nostalgic are drawn to the more 
right-wing and conservative end of the political spectrum where political parties 
stress the preservation of traditional values rather than societal change.
The paradox of the success of nostalgic rhetoric is that its focus on a past – that 
is, a selective and constructed version of it – entails a demand for a radical break 
with the present. Today’s political entrepreneurs who peddle nostalgia call for a 
shift away from the status quo towards an unknown end. It is an open question, 
though, if these nostalgic visions can be a basis for effective governing and the 
political problem solving which requires compromises and planning.
We should not simply discard the success of a rhetoric of nostalgia based on 
its lack of realism. The main challenge for mainstream parties on the left and 
right is to deal with the underlying anxieties and fears that make people open for 
feelings of nostalgia: to ask, who presents the world as unorderly and chaotic, and 
how might we help people to feel safe and secure? How can political elites for-
mulate and articulate views about the future, even those developed from idealized 
views of the past, that give people a sense of hope rather than fear. Emotions will 
remain part of people’s lives and inform their understandings of their societies. 
The elevation of these emotions, then directed towards present and future politi-
cal goals articulated in the name of lessening current anxieties, might well assist 
in the management of political problems rather than furthering any perception 
of instability. To date many mainstream politicians focus mainly on technocratic 
17
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solutions, thus ignoring these emotional needs. Nostalgia could be allowed to 
create a politics which exaggerates insecurities, but it might also be invoked to 
establish a politics which curtails anxieties and establishes a more secure future. 
This would require politicians to develop rhetoric that is sensitive to the past, 
while at the same time hopeful towards the future. 
18
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Method 
T his report presents an overview of a study conducted by Dalia Research in July 2018 on public opinion across 28 EU Member States. The sample of n=10.885 was drawn across all 28 EU Member States, taking into ac-count current population distributions with regard to age (14-65 years), 
gender and region/country. In order to obtain census representative results, the 
data were weighted based upon the most recent Eurostat statistics. The target 
weighting variables were age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED 
(2011) levels 0-2, 3-4, and 5-8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). 
An iterative algorithm was used to identify the optimal combination of weighting 
variables based on sample composition within each country. An estimation of 
the overall design effect based on the distribution of weights was calculated at 
1.45 at the global level. Calculated for a sample of this size and considering the 
design-effect, the margin of error would be +/-1.1 % at a confidence level of 95 %.
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 Who are the nostalgics?
Do you agree with the following statement?  
“The world used to be a much better place.”
Agree Disagree
EU28 67 % 33 %
France 65 % 35 %
Germany 61 % 39 %
Italy 77 % 23 %
Poland 59 % 41 %
Spain 64 % 36 %
 EU28: Who are the nostalgics  across age groups? 
Do you agree with the following statement?  
“The world used to be a much better place.”
Agree Disagree
16–25 52 % 48 %
26–35 65 % 35 %
36–45 72 % 28 %
46–55 71 % 29 %
56–65 70 % 30 %
Data Appendix
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 EU28: Nostalgic distributions across socio-economic groups? 
Nostalgic Not Nostalgic
Economically anxious 27 % 16 %
Men 53 % 44 %
Belonging to the working class 41 % 30 %
Low educated 26 % 20 %
Unemployed 18 % 14 %
Rural residents 25 % 27 %
Personal political views on a left-right scale
If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes  
your political views on a left-right scale? 
Left Centre Left Centre Right Right
EU28 Nostalgic 20 % 27 % 32 % 21 %
EU28 Not Nostalgic 22 % 36 % 27 % 15 %
France Nostalgic 31 % 15 % 21 % 33 %
France Not Nostalgic 32 % 26 % 22 % 20 %
Germany Nostalgic 12 % 37 % 41 % 10 %
Germany Not Nostalgic 16 % 53 % 28 % 3 %
Italy Nostalgic 17 % 21 % 37 % 25 %
Italy Not Nostalgic 21 % 30 % 31 % 18 %
Poland Nostalgic 21 % 24 % 24 % 31 %
Poland Not Nostalgic 17 % 24 % 25 % 34 %
Spain Nostalgic 30 % 31 % 24 % 15 %
Spain Not Nostalgic 33 % 33 % 25 % 9 %
Personal political views on a left-right scale
If you had to choose one of the below, which option best describes  
your political views on a left-right scale?
Left Centre Left Centre Right Right
EU28 21 % 30 % 30 % 19 %
France 31 % 19 % 21 % 29 %
Germany 13 % 44 % 36 % 7 %
Italy 18 % 23 % 36 % 23 %
Poland 19 % 24 % 24 % 33 %
Spain 31 % 32 % 24 % 13 %
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 EU28: Views on Immigration
Percentage of respondents agree or disagree with the following statements.
Agree Disagree
Immigrants take away jobs from natives
Nostalgic 53 % 47 %
Not Nostalgic 30 % 70 %
Recent immigrants do not want to fit into society
Nostalgic 78 % 22 %
Not Nostalgic 63 % 37 %
Immigration is good for the economy
Nostalgic 45 % 55 %
Not Nostalgic 63 % 37 %
Immigrants enrich cultural life
Nostalgic 50 % 50 %
Not Nostalgic 66 % 34 %
 
EU28: Wanted as Neighbours?
No Yes
Immigrants
Nostalgic 27 % 73 %
Not Nostalgic 15 % 85 %
Lesbians or gays
Nostalgic 13 % 87 %
Not Nostalgic 9 % 91 %
Families with children
Nostalgic 9 % 91 %
Not Nostalgic 7 % 93 %
People having a different religion
Nostalgic 10 % 90 %
Not Nostalgic 6 % 94 %
People speaking a different language
Nostalgic 10 % 90 %
Not Nostalgic 7 % 93 %
Smokers
Nostalgic 18 % 82 %
Not Nostalgic 21 % 79 %
DATA APPENDIX
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 EU expectations
Percentage of respondents agree or disagree with the following statements.
Agree Disagree
Remain in EU
Nostalgic 67 % 33 %
Not Nostalgic 82 % 18 %
Enhance EU border control
Nostalgic 88 % 12 %
Not Nostalgic 82 % 18 %
Protect free movement
Nostalgic 87 % 13 %
Not Nostalgic 91 % 9 %
EU should be more active in world affairs
Nostalgic 80 % 20 %
Not Nostalgic 85 % 15 %
Need for more political and economic integration
Nostalgic 51 % 49 %
Not Nostalgic 57 % 43 %
Allow EU migrants to work and settle
Nostalgic 55 % 45 %
Not Nostalgic 57 % 43 %
 EU28: EU’s Policy priorities 
What tasks should the EU focus on in the coming years? 
Nostalgic Not Nostalgic
Fight Terrorism 60 % 47 %
Manage Migration 51 % 43 %
Protect Citizen Rights 43 % 45 %
Secure Peace 42 % 46 %
Fight inequality 28 % 35 %
Create growth 27 % 30 %
Stop Climate Change 22 % 28 %
Fix Eurozone 16 % 13 %
Tame globalization 15 % 10 %
List of Table and Figures
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